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Did the Sky Really Fall? 
Ten Years after California’s Proposition 209 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Discrimination and preferential treatment based on immutable 
characteristics, such as race and sex, are hotly contested issues in the 
courts and among the general public.1 On November 5, 1996, the people 
of California adopted Proposition 209, an initiative that promised an end 
to state discrimination and preferential treatment based on race, sex, 
color, and national origin in public employment, education, and 
contracting.2 Proposition 209 was a widely debated and highly 
 1. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1070 (Cal. 2000) (“In the history of 
this Court and this country, few questions have been more divisive than those arising from 
governmental action taken on the basis of race” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 
(1980))); Bob Berring, Affirmative Action in Perspective, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2003) (reviewing 
ANDREA GUERRERO, SILENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(2002); Tom McNamee, Who Really Benefits from Colleges’ Affirmative Action?: Studies Show 
Many are Immigrants, Biracial Students, CHI. SUN TIMES, July 19, 2004, at 10; Q & A with Ward 
Connerly: Erase Racial Preferences; They’re No Solution in Schools, Society, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Mar. 23, 2004, available at http://www.freep.com/voices/columnists/webconn23_20040323.htm 
(last accessed May 23, 2005). 
 2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). . . The full text of the amendment reads: 
(a) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any 
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. 
(b) This section shall apply only to action taken after the section’s effective date. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting bona fide qualifications 
based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public 
employment, public education, or public contracting. 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as invalidating any court order or consent 
decree which is in force as of the effective date of this section. 
(e) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prohibiting action which must be taken 
to establish or maintain eligibility for any federal program, where ineligibility would 
result in a loss of federal funds to the state. 
(f) For the purposes of this section, “state” shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, 
the state itself, any city, county, city and county, public university system, including the 
University of California, community college district, school district, special district, or 
any other political subdivision or governmental instrumentality of or within the state. 
(g) The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of 
the injured party’s race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available 
for violations of then existing California anti-discrimination law. 
(h) This section shall be self-executing. If any part or parts of this section are found to be 
in conflict with federal law or the United States Constitution, the section shall be 
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controversial citizens’ initiative to amend the state constitution.3 The 
tenth anniversary of Proposition 209 is approaching and presents an 
opportunity to evaluate the effect of California’s approach to eliminating 
discrimination and preferences based on race and sex.4
Californians were sharply divided over Proposition 209. A U.C. 
Berkeley poll surveying whites and minorities who lived in 
predominantly minority communities found that the majority of both 
these groups still felt that affirmative action was necessary.5 However, 
the majority of both whites and minorities also preferred that job 
advancement and college admissions be based solely on merit rather than 
on a system considering race and gender.6 Most of the Latinos, African-
Americans, and Asians surveyed said they would oppose Prop. 209, 
while 54% of their white neighbors said they would support it.7  TV 
advertising during the final weeks of the Proposition 209 campaign 
increased dramatically and seemed to sway a significant number of 
women voters.8 A Field Poll taken two weeks before Election Day 
showed that 40 percent of women favored Proposition 209 and 42 
percent opposed it.9 One week before Election Day, 49 percent of women 
implemented to the maximum extent that federal law and the United States Constitution 
permit. Any provision held invalid shall be severable from the remaining portions of this 
section. 
 3. See B. Drummond Ayres Jr., Politics: The Initiatives; Affirmative Action Measure Nears 
a High-Profile Finish, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at 6 (“In the last 10 days, both President Clinton, 
who opposes the measure, and Bob Dole, who supports it, have jumped into the debate, trying 
belatedly to affect the outcome after months of shying away out of fear that the issue has a double 
edge, politically.”); Edward W. Lempinen, Furor Over Latest Anti-209 Ad TV Spots Feature Cross-
Burnings, Hooded Klansmen, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 1, 1996, at A29 (“The leaders of the Proposition 
209 campaign and the state Republican Party yesterday attacked new advertisements by 209 
opponents that link the measure against affirmative action with cross-burnings, hooded Klansmen 
and the anti-abortion movement.”); Seth Rosenfeld and Scott Winokur, Prop. 209 Divisive, Poll 
Finds Results Show Depth, Complexity of California’s Racial and Ethnic Makeup, S.F. EXAMINER, 
Nov. 3, 1996, at C1 (“. . . Prop. 209, the strident debate it triggered and the possible loss of 
affirmative action programs will intensify racial issues in California”). 
 4. While the language of the amendment bans discrimination and preferential treatment 
based on five immutable characteristics – race, sex, color, ethnicity, and national origin – this Note 
will often refer only to preferences and/or discrimination generally to avoid repeating this list. This 
Note also refers to race and sex, which should be interpreted as being equally inclusive of all five of 
the above-named attributes. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 5. Seth Rosenfeld and Scott Winokur, Prop. 209 Divisive, Poll Finds Results Show Depth, 
Complexity of California’s Racial and Ethnic Makeup, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 3, 1996, at C1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Edward W. Lempinen and Susan Yoachum, Ad Blitz Boosts Support for Prop. 209 in 
Field Poll, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 4, 1996 at A1 (reporting that during the home-stretch ad campaigns 
the 209 campaign and the state Republican Party had plans to spend roughly $3 million and their 
opponents were spending about $1.5 million). 
 9. Id. 
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favored Proposition 209 and 39 percent opposed it.10 Among white 
women, 55 percent were in favor of Proposition 209 and 33 percent were 
opposed.11 On Election Day, a majority of whites cast their vote in favor 
of Proposition 209, while the majority of minorities were against the 
measure.12 Thus, support for Proposition 209 came primarily from 
California’s white population. 
Before Proposition 209 was adopted, many of California’s 
governmental agencies administered programs with goals or quotas as 
part of an effort to eliminate racial imbalance in areas such as public 
employment, education, and contracting.13 For example, the City of San 
Jose adopted a program requiring contractors to meet certain 
requirements that included participating in a minority and women 
business outreach program, or utilizing a specified percentage of 
minority and women businesses (the participation program).14 Bids were 
considered responsive if the contractors utilized a specified percentage of 
minority and women subcontractors in their contracts.15 Those 
contractors whose bid did not include the specified percentage of 
minority and women subcontractors could submit bids if they 
documented extensive outreach efforts to minority and women 
subcontractors.16 This entailed maintaining records of written notice to 
minority and woman subcontractors, making at least three attempts to 
contact those subcontractors, and specifying the reasons for rejecting any 
bids by minority or women subcontractors.17 The bids of contractors who 
did not complete either the participation or documentation components 
were rejected for noncompliance with the public contracting program’s 
requirements.18 Before California voters adopted Proposition 209, these 
types of programs had the weight of state statutes and judicial precedent 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
Among white voters, 63% were for Proposition 209, while 37% opposed it.  Among Black voters, 
26% were in favor of Proposition 209 and 74% were opposed.  Among Latino voters, 24% were in 
favor of Proposition 209 and 76% were opposed.  Among Asian voters, 39% were in favor of 
Proposition 209 and 61% were opposed. 
 13. Bras v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 59 F.3d 869, 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing 
preferences given to minority and women owned businesses in awarding contracts); Crawford v. 
Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2002) 
(describing a high school district transfer policy designed to promote an appropriate racial and ethnic 
balance); Kidd v. State Pers. Bd., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1998) (describing 
preferences given to women and minorities in state employment decisions). 
 14. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1070-72 (Cal. 2000). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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behind them.19
During the highly intense and often contentious debate over 
Proposition 209 preceding its adoption, many scholars claimed that 
Proposition 209 would have a negative impact on women and 
minorities.20 For example, Erwin Chemerinsky, then a professor at the 
University of Southern California Law Center, wrote the leading article 
in opposition to Proposition 209 and predicted that many important state 
and local affirmative action programs would be eliminated and more 
discrimination would be tolerated.21 Chemerinsky concluded, 
“[Proposition 209] would have a devastating effect on programs 
designed to remedy discrimination against women and minorities. The 
gains of past years would be erased, and additional progress would be 
unlikely.”22 Some critics claimed that the initiative would “ban ethnic 
studies majors, repeal existing bans on sex discrimination, or prohibit all 
‘affirmative action’ programs.”23 Others predicted that even if adopted, 
Proposition 209 would be ignored and go unenforced.24 These dire 
forecasts did not stop the voters of California from adopting the measure 
in an attempt to end discrimination and preferential treatment based on 
race and sex.25 Contrary to the predictions of its opponents, Proposition 
209 has been effective in eliminating state-sponsored discrimination and 
preferential treatment based on race and sex without hindering the 
progress of minorities and women. 
This article will address Proposition 209’s elimination of state-
sponsored discrimination and preferential treatment based on race and 
 19. See, e.g., Price v. Civil Serv. Comm’n 604 P.2d 1365 (Cal. 1980) (Mosk, J. dissenting); 
Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2003); 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35160.5. (2002); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 87101, 87102 (2001). 
 20. See Pamela Burdman, Tien Explains Opposition to Prop. 209: 2 Chancellors Openly 
Contradict UC Regents, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1996, at A13 (“Both chancellors said their experience 
building diverse campuses led to their firm belief that diversity is a key component of quality.”); 
Derrick Z. Jackson, Facts Favor Affirmative Action, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1996, at A17 (citing 
law professor David Oppenheimer and economist Martin Carnoy as predicting dire results for 
minorities if Proposition 209 were to pass). 
 21. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the Proposed California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 999 (1996). Professor Chemerinsky’s article has been cited by at least five 
appellate briefs in Proposition 209-related litigation and at least 16 law review articles and treatises. 
 22. Id. at 1018. 
 23. Neil Gotanda, Legal Implications of Proposition 209 – The California Civil Rights 
Initiative, 24 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996); Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: 
An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1997); See also Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie 
Levanson, Sex Discrimination Made Legal, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996, at B9. 
 24. See David Kline, Voters Should Go After Government Officials Who Ignore Proposition 
209, METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE, Dec. 6, 1996, at 7; High Court Won’t Review Challenge to 
Proposition 209, METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE, November 4, 1997, at 1; Gail Heriot, Thoughts 
on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger as Law and as Practical Politics, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
137, 168-169 (2004). 
 25. See Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1086-87 (Cal. 2000). 
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sex and its effect on women and minorities. Section II provides 
background on the adoption and provisions of Proposition 209. Section 
III examines the litigation finding Proposition 209 constitutional and 
defining its scope. Section IV compares the predictions of Proposition 
209’s opponents with the actual effect of Proposition 209 on women and 
minorities ten years later. Finally, Section V discusses adopting 
California’s approach to eliminating discrimination and preferential 
treatment in other states. 
 
II.  CALIFORNIA VOTERS AMENDED THE CONSTITUTION TO ELIMINATE 
STATE DISCRIMINATION 
 
By adopting Proposition 209, California voters amended the 
California State Constitution, the organic law that determines the state’s 
governing principles, with a goal of eliminating race- and sex-based 
discrimination and preferences.26 The language of Proposition 209 
closely parallels Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.27 The first 
United States Supreme Court decision to consider an alleged violation of 
Title VII concluded, “What is required by Congress is the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other 
impermissible classification.”28 As California Supreme Court Justice 
Janice Brown explained, 
 
voters intended to reinstitute the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act 
and equal protection that predated Weber, and Bakke II, as well as 
Price, an interpretation reflecting the philosophy that ‘[h]owever it is 
rationalized, a preference to any group constitutes inherent inequality. 
Moreover, preferences, for any purpose, are anathema to the very 
process of democracy.29
 
 26. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1997) (“On November 5, 
1996, the people of the State of California adopted the California Civil Rights Initiative as an 
amendment to their Constitution.”). 
 27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .”; see also 
CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION at 32 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 209) 
(Nov. 5, 1996) (“Proposition 209 is called the California Civil Rights Initiative because it restates 
the historic Civil Rights Act . . . .”). 
 28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428, 431 (1971). 
 29. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1083 (quoting Price v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 602 P.2d 1365, 1390-
91 (Cal. 1980) (Mosk, J. dissenting)) (internal citations omitted). 
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When the government implements programs that discriminate or 
give preferential treatment based on race or sex, including programs such 
as participation goals or quotas, it is drawing a line based on race and 
sex.30 Proposition 209 removes the lines drawn by government when 
they are based on race and sex.31
Proposition 209 is limited to programs administered by the state 
itself, cities, counties, political subdivisions, and governmental 
instrumentalities, and specifically those involving public employment, 
public education, and public contracting.32 Private enterprises are 
unaffected by the amendment.33 There are three exceptions to state action 
which allow discriminatory and/or preferential programs to continue: (1) 
bona fide qualifications based on sex;34 (2) court orders and consent 
decrees already in force;35 and (3) actions necessary for receipt of federal 
funds.36
Essentially, Proposition 209 eliminates “affirmative action” 
programs that discriminate or grant preferential treatment to individuals 
because of their race or sex.37 Affirmative action is often a confusing 
term because it can be defined either as (1) a preference for certain 
persons where there is total equality of objectively ascertained 
qualifications, or (2) a preference for persons with lower objectively 
ascertained qualifications, to the corresponding exclusion of persons 
better qualified.38 The latter is clearly prohibited by Proposition 209 and 
 30. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1084. 
 31. See Id. (comparing participation goals to quotas and set asides and finding that they vary 
only in degree and thus remain “a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status as well as sex.”). 
See also Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2001) (“What is 
constitutionally significant is that the government has drawn a line on the basis of race or has 
engaged in a purposeful use of racial criteria.”). 
 32. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a), (f). 
 33. Id. at § 31(a). See also Volokh, supra note 23, at 1339 (“[Proposition 209] applies only to 
actions by ‘[t]he state,’ including all the state’s subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Private 
enterprises are excluded.” (footnote omitted)). 
 34. Id. at § 31(c). No programs have been challenged under the bona fide qualifications based 
on sex exception. For further discussion of this exception, see Volokh, supra note 23, at 1364-86. 
 35. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(d). 
 36. Id. at § 31(e). For a more thorough treatment of the Federal Funding Exception see 
Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr. & Travis J. Lindsey, The Last Refuge of Official Discrimination: The 
Federal Funding Exception to California’s Proposition 209, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457 (2004). 
 37. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a). 
 38. See Lungren v. Super. Ct., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 694 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1996) (finding the 
term “affirmative action” amorphous and value-laden, and stating that “[m]ost definitions of the term 
would include not only the conduct which Proposition 209 would ban, i.e., discrimination and 
preferential treatment, but also other efforts such as outreach programs. Accordingly, any statement 
to the effect that Proposition 209 repeals affirmative action programs would be overinclusive and 
hence ‘false and misleading.’” (internal ciation omitted)); CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, 
GENERAL ELECTION at 32 (Argument in Favor of Proposition 209) (Nov. 5, 1996) (“Real 
‘affirmative action’ originally meant no discrimination and sought to provide opportunity.”). 
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the former is likely to be prohibited by Proposition 209, because it would 
be a preference based on race or sex.39 Proposition 209 leaves intact any 
program, whether labeled affirmative action or outreach, that does not 
single out individuals because of their race or sex.40 For example, an 
outreach program that compels contractors to target minority and women 
subcontractors would violate Proposition 209, while outreach programs 
providing information to all available subcontractors would not violate 
Proposition 209.41
A majority of Californians supported the initiative.42 Proposition 209 
passed with an 8% margin.43 Governor Pete Wilson and Attorney 
General Dan Lungren responded without delay by issuing an Executive 
Order and instructing state agencies to comply immediately with 
Proposition 209.44 Today, Californians continue to enjoy the right to be 
free from the effects of state discrimination and preferential treatment by 
government entities based on race and sex, despite fierce, continued 
opposition.45
 
 
 
 
 
 39. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION at 32 (Argument in Favor of 
Proposition 209) (Nov. 5, 1996) ( “Proposition 209 prohibits discrimination and preferences and 
allows any program that does not discriminate, or prefer, because of race or sex, to continue.”) 
 40. See CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET at 32 (“Proposition 209 . . . allows any program that 
does not discriminate, or prefer, because of race or sex, to continue.”). See also Lungren, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d at 694. 
 41. See, e.g., Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1084 (Cal. 
2000). See also Id. at 1090 (Mosk, J., concurring) (“[The San Jose contracting program] skews the 
process in favor of subcontracting firms that are owned by women or members of minority groups. 
Not only does it invite those firms into the process, it also guarantees that they will be dealt with 
well during its course, and will not be ushered out without reason at its end. It does not do the same 
for others.”). 
 42. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1495 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated as 
moot, Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1495. Pete Wilson’s Executive Order (Exec. Order No. W-136-96 (1996)) required 
“state agencies to promulgate implementing regulations and identify all state statutes and programs 
pertaining to employment, education or contracting that grant or encourage preferences based on 
race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin.” Id. 
 45. See Bobby Caina Calvan, States Eye Court’s Race-Based Admissions Ruling Some Calif. 
Leaders Seeking to Repeal Proposition 209, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 2003, at A3 (“Advocates of 
affirmative action in California, particularly Latino and African-American leaders, expressed hope 
that the Supreme Court decision in a University of Michigan case on Monday would give them 
leverage to lift a statewide ban on considering race or ethnicity in college admissions.”); Jim 
Sanders, Judge: Law violates Prop. 209, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 13, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 
WLNR 7602862 (reporting on a ruling by Superior Court Judge Thomas M. Cecil which held that 
legislation adopted two years earlier was unconstitutional and in violation of Proposition 209). 
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III.  JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION HAS AFFIRMED VOTERS’ INTENT TO 
ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
 
The judicial opinions involving Proposition 209 upheld the measure 
and explained whether certain types of programs are allowed or are 
prohibited. In the initial challenge to Proposition 209’s constitutionality, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision 
and found Proposition 209 constitutional.46 Government programs that 
discriminate or grant preferences based on race or sex are in violation of 
Proposition 209.47 Whether a government program discriminates or 
grants preferential treatment is determined in accordance with the natural 
and ordinary meaning of the words.48 California’s judiciary has narrowly 
interpreted the federal funding exception.49 The decisions of the key 
cases and their interpretation of Proposition 209 are discussed in the 
following three sections. 
 
A.  The Ninth Circuit Affirmed the Constitutionality of Proposition 209 
 
The day after California voters adopted Proposition 209 to end 
discrimination and preferences based on race and sex, its 
constitutionality was challenged in federal court.50 Judge Thelton 
Henderson granted a temporary restraining order just over a month later, 
enjoining the state’s enforcement of Proposition 209 based on the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.51 He recognized 
that Californians meant to do more than restate existing law by passing 
Proposition 209 and that “the primary change Proposition 209 makes to 
existing law is to close that narrow but significant window that permits 
the governmental race- and gender-conscious affirmative action 
programs . . . that are still permissible under the United States 
Constitution.”52 Opponents to the amendment feared that the elimination 
of the race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs still 
 46. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 47. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1084 (Cal. 2000); 
Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 30, 41-42 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2001). 
 48. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1082. The dictionary definitions were used to determine the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the constitutional amendment, in conformance with the 
court’s precedent. Id. See  Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 
583 P.2d 1281, 1300 (Cal. 1978) (“A constitutional amendment should be construed in accordance 
with the natural and ordinary meaning of its words.”). 
 49. C&C Constr., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 723-24 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 3d 2004). 
 50. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 51. Id. at 1489. 
 52. Id. at 1489-90. 
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permissible under the United States Constitution, which were 
implemented to remediate past and present discrimination, would reduce 
opportunities for women and minorities in public contracting, 
employment, and education.53 The plaintiffs argued that Proposition 209 
restructured “the political process to disadvantage only those seeking to 
enact legislation intended to benefit minorities and women,” thus 
depriving minorities and women of their right to equal protection of the 
laws.54
Judge Henderson agreed and concluded that Proposition 209 likely 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee to full 
participation in the political life of the community and that it would 
likely violate the Supremacy Clause because of a conflict with Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.55 He reasoned that preferences unrelated to 
race and sex remained unaffected by Proposition 209, effectively 
singling out women and minorities for unfavorable political treatment.56 
The court found that despite Proposition 209’s facially neutral language, 
the initiative made distinctions based on race and sex because women 
and minorities have a special interest in preferential treatment.57 
Accordingly, he granted a restraining order prohibiting the enforcement 
of Proposition 209.58
The Ninth Circuit vacated the restraining order, and found no 
constitutional violation in Proposition 209.59 The appeals court 
explained, “The ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause is ‘to do 
away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race.’”60 
The court goes on to say “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, lest we lose 
sight of the forest for the trees, does not require what it barely permits.”61 
 53. See id. at 1489, 1494-95. For example, the city of San Francisco “adopted a race- and 
gender-conscious affirmative action program after finding that it was necessary to counter 
established discriminatory practices, including ‘old boy networks,’ that prevented minority and 
women contractors from obtaining city contracts.” Id. at 1489 n.3 (citing Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1413-18 (9th Cir. 1991). Webster’s 
dictionary defines “old boy” as “a man who is a member of a long-standing and usu[ally] influential 
clique esp[ecially] in a professional, business, or social sphere.”  Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
(10th ed. 1995)). 
 54. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1499. 
 55. Id. at 1520. 
 56. Id at 1505 (“[T]he primary practical effect of Proposition 209 is to eliminate existing 
governmental race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs in contracting, education, and 
employment and prohibit their creation in the future, while leaving governmental entities free to 
employ preferences based on any criteria other than race or gender.”). 
 57. Id. at 1502, 1504, 1508. 
 58. Id. at 1520. 
 59. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 60. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
 61. Wilson, 122 F.3d at 709. The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that “[t]o the extent that 
Proposition 209 prohibits race and gender preferences to a greater degree than the Equal Protection 
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Because Proposition 209 prohibits any discrimination or preference 
based on race or sex, it addresses race- and sex-related matters in a 
neutral fashion and does not burden individual rights to equal 
treatment.62 Rather than classifying individuals by race or sex, the 
initiative prohibits the state from making classifications based on race or 
sex.63 The challenge to Proposition 209 was based on the impediment it 
posed to receiving preferential treatment.64 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that women and minorities do not have a right to preferential treatment 
under the Equal Protection Clause and the court held that placing a 
burden on achieving race- or sex-based preferential treatment does not 
deny individuals equal protection of the law.65
The district court’s finding that Proposition 209 violates Title VII 
was also dismissed because of the express pre-emption provisions of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.66 The pre-emption provisions indicate that state 
laws are only pre-empted by federal law if they actually conflict with the 
federal law.67 Since Proposition 209 does not require any unlawful 
employment practice, it does not conflict with Title VII.68 Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Proposition 209 does not violate the 
United States Constitution.69
 
Clause, it provides greater protection to members of the gender and races otherwise burdened by the 
preference.” Id. at 709 n.18 (citing Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)). 
 62. Wilson, 122 F.3d at 707-08. 
 63. Id at 702. 
When the government prefers individuals on account of their race or gender, it 
correspondingly disadvantages individuals who fortuitously belong to another race or to 
the other gender . . . . Proposition 209 amends the California Constitution simply to 
prohibit state discrimination against or preferential treatment to any person on account of 
race or gender. 
Id. 
 64. Id. at 708. 
 65. See id. (“It is one thing to say that individuals have equal protection rights against 
political obstructions to equal treatment; it is quite another to say that individuals have equal 
protection rights against political obstructions to preferential treatment. While the Constitution 
protects against obstructions to equal treatment, it erects obstructions to preferential treatment by its 
own terms.”) 
 66. Id. at 710 (“Because Title VII by its plain language does not pre-empt Proposition 209, 
the district court relied on an erroneous legal premise in concluding that plaintiffs are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their pre-emption claims.”). 
 67. Id. Section 708 of Title VII provides: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any 
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State 
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or 
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this 
subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 § 708. 
 68. Wilson, 122 F.3d at 710. 
 69. Id. 
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B.  Government Programs that Discriminate or Give Preferential 
Treatment are in Violation of Proposition 209 
 
The California Supreme Court granted review in Hi-Voltage Wire 
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose in order “to settle [an] important question 
of state constitutional law.”70 The California Supreme Court then 
delivered an “extended perspective” to “illuminate[] the meaning and 
purpose of Proposition 209 and guide[] its application.”71 Indeed, while a 
majority of the court conceded that “it may be possible to resolve the 
matter” on narrow considerations, the majority consciously decided 
instead to “discern and thereby effectuate the voters’ intention . . . by 
interpreting [Proposition 209’s] language in its historical context.”72
In San Jose, the city adopted a program requiring contractors to 
either meet participation goals by utilizing a specified percentage of 
minority and women subcontractors, or to document targeted outreach 
efforts to include minority and women subcontractors in their bids.73 The 
bids of those contractors who did not meet participation goals or 
document their targeted outreach efforts to minorities and women were 
not considered.74 The court found that, at a minimum, the participation 
component of the contracting program encouraged discriminatory race 
and sex-conscious numerical goals.75
San Jose defended its outreach documentation program by arguing 
that focused and targeted outreach did not fall within the scope of 
Proposition 209.76 However, the California Supreme Court noted that 
voters had access to both the Legislative Analyst’s report and the 
arguments against Proposition 209, which specifically indicated that 
outreach would likely be eliminated to the extent it operated based on 
race or sex.77 San Jose argued that its outreach requirement merely 
 70. Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Cal. 2000). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1070. 
 73. Id. at 1070-71. 
 74. Id. at 1071. 
 75. Id. at 1084 (“A participation goal differs from a quota or set-aside only in degree; by 
whatever label, it remains ‘a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status’ as well as sex.” 
(quoting Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978))). 
 76. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1086. 
 77. Id. The analysis by the Legislative Analyst lists outreach programs as an example of 
affirmative action programs and states “[t]his measure would eliminate state and local government 
affirmative action programs in the areas of public employment, public education, and public 
contracting to the extent these programs involve ‘preferential treatment’ based on race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin.”  CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION at 30 
(Argument in Favor of Proposition 209) (Nov. 5, 1996). The ballot pamphlet argument against 
Proposition 209 lists outreach as an affirmative action program that helps to ensure equal 
opportunity for women and minorities. Id. at 33. The argument against Proposition 209 warned, 
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expanded the applicant pool, but the court found this misleading and 
irrelevant because the program automatically eliminated bids that failed 
to document outreach to minority- and women-owned businesses; such 
documentation was not required for non-minority- and non-woman-
owned businesses.78
The city offered further support for its program by arguing that the 
equal protection clause does not preclude race- and sex-conscious 
programs.79 However, the court maintained that the equal protection 
clause does not preclude a state from providing its citizens greater 
protection against race- and sex-conscious programs, as California voters 
did by passing Proposition 209.80 The court construed the terms 
“discriminate” and “preferential treatment” in accordance with the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the words by turning to a dictionary.81 
“‘Discriminate’ means ‘to make distinctions in treatment; show partiality 
(in favor of) or prejudice (against).’”82 Preferential means “giving 
‘preference,’ which is ‘a giving of priority or advantage to one person . . . 
over others.’”83 San Jose’s outreach program was unconstitutional 
because it granted preferential treatment based on race and sex by 
compelling non-minority contractors to contact minority- and women-
owned businesses and solicit their participation, thus giving these 
businesses an advantage over other businesses.84
California courts have invalidated a number of discriminatory 
practices that were in violation of Proposition 209. For instance, in 1998, 
the State Personnel Board’s policy of using “supplemental certification” 
in hiring decisions was invalidated under Proposition 209.85 
Supplemental certification allowed minority and female applicants 
seeking positions in the state civil service to be considered for 
employment without meeting the usual requirement of placing in the top 
“Proposition 209 will eliminate affirmative action programs like these that help achieve equal 
opportunity for women and minorities in public employment, education and contracting.” Id. 
 78. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1084, 1087. 
 79. Id. at 1087. 
 80. Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 654 (1993) (“with respect to equal protection, 
‘courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires.’”)). 
 81. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1082. The dictionary definitions were used to determine the 
natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the constitutional amendment, in conformance with the 
court’s precedent. See  Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. Of Equalization 583 
P.2d 1281, 1300 (Cal. 1978) (“A constitutional amendment should be construed in accordance with 
the natural and ordinary meaning of its words.”). 
 82. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1082 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 392 (3d 
college ed. 1988)). 
 83. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1082 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1062 (3d 
college ed. 1988)). 
 84. Hi-Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1084. 
 85. Kidd v. State Pers. Bd., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758, 760, 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1998). 
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three ranks of the list of eligible candidates.86 The court determined that 
the practice of using supplemental certification violated Proposition 209 
and was therefore unconstitutional because it disregarded merit and 
encouraged promotions based on race and sex.87
Proposition 209 also prohibits legislative programs that discriminate 
against, or grant preferences to, individuals or groups based upon race or 
sex.88 For example, California’s Education Code previously promoted 
the adoption of an affirmative action employment program in community 
colleges “designed to seek, hire, and promote persons who are 
underrepresented in the work force compared to their number in the 
population, including handicapped persons, women, and persons of 
minority racial and ethnic backgrounds.”89 The program required each 
community college district to have a plan with hiring goals and 
timetables as a condition for receipt of allowances.90 Funds were made 
available for implementing the hiring plans with a goal that, by the year 
2005, the race and sex composition of the community college system 
work force would be proportionate to that of the adult population of the 
state.91 The legislature’s program was struck down by the California 
Appeals Court as unconstitutional because of the discriminatory nature 
of the hiring plan and the preferential treatment given to women and 
minorities in hiring decisions.92 Instead of making inclusive outreach 
efforts to assure equal opportunity, the program required colleges to 
single out minorities and women.93 The court explained that when the 
legislature chooses to rely on race and sex distinctions, the scheme is 
presumptively invalid; the courts should not defer to legislative 
pronouncements. The legislature cannot rely on race and sex distinctions 
without meeting the heavy burden required to justify the use of the 
distinctions.94
 86. Id. at 762. 
Supplemental certification allows those members of an underutilized class, for present 
purposes minorities and women, to have their names added to the list of eligible 
applicants even though the particular minority or female applicant did not score within 
the top three ranks . . . . [W]hile supplemental certification does not guarantee that a 
member of an underutilized class will be selected for employment, it does make minority 
and female applicants eligible for employment who otherwise could not be considered for 
employment. 
 Id. 
 87. Id. at 767, 772. 
 88. Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2001). 
 89. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 87101-87102 (2001). 
 90. See Id. 
 91. Connerly, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40-41. 
 92. Id. at 41-42. 
 93. Id. at 41. 
 94. Id. at 37 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989). 
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In 2003, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 703 to 
redefine the term “racial discrimination” for purposes of Proposition 
209.95 The new definition conflicted with the plain meaning of the term 
as construed by the California Supreme Court.96 The legislature adopted 
the definition of discrimination used by the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which allows 
“[s]pecial measures [to be] taken for the sole purpose of securing 
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups . . . .”97 A 
California appellate court found that “Assembly Bill 703 amounted to an 
attempt by the Legislature and the Governor to amend the California 
Constitution without complying with the procedures for amendment.”98 
About eight months later, a state trial court prevented the Governor and 
Attorney General from enforcing the new law’s definition by imposing a 
permanent injunction against the new law.99
 
C.  The Federal Funding Exception is Interpreted Narrowly 
 
The federal funding exception is a narrow exception to the 
prohibition on discrimination and preferential treatment based on race or 
sex.100 In 1998, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) 
implemented an affirmative action program offering numerous 
advantages to bids from contractors submitted by minorities or 
contractors who subcontracted with minorities.101 The program also 
required contractors to make broad outreach efforts and to document 
 95. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 8315(a) (2005). 
 96. C&C Constr., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 726 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 3d 2004); 
Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1082 (Cal. 2000). 
 97. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 8315(b)(2005). 
 98. C&C Constr., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 726. 
 99. Connerly v. Davis, Case No. 03AS05154, J. and Permanent Prohibitory Injunction 
(Superior Court of Cal., County of Sacramento May 12, 2005). 
 100. C&C Constr., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 723 (“[I]n order to discriminate based on race, the 
governmental agency must have substantial evidence that it will lose federal funding if it does not 
use race-based measures and must narrowly tailor those measures to minimize race-based 
discrimination.”). See also Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr. & Travis J. Lindsey, The Last Refuge of 
Official Discrimination: The Federal Funding Exception to California’s Proposition 209, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 493 (2004) (explaining that a broad interpretation of the federal funding exception 
would “undermine the intent of California’s voters to remove the State from the business of granting 
preferential treatment to some individuals and groups simply because of their race or sex.”). 
 101. C&C Constr., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 720. The benefits included a five percent price 
advantage for prime contractors, capped at $50,000, in all proposals up to $1,000,000 submitted by 
certified businesses owned by African-Americans or Hispanic-Americans. Id. The same price 
advantage was offered to all prime contractors who obtain the subcontractors’ goal of 8% each, on 
proposals over $50,000 for subcontracts less than $1,000,000 submitted by certified businesses 
owned by Asian Pacific-Americans or African-Americans. Id. 
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efforts sufficient to comply with the program’s requirements.102 SMUD 
reasoned that to maintain federal funding, it had to comply with 
regulations that mandate implementation of affirmative action programs 
to remediate the effects of any past discrimination.103
However, there was no evidence that a race-neutral program could 
not satisfy the requirements to maintain federal funding.104 SMUD was 
unable to identify a federal law or regulation that required race-based 
remedies to maintain their federal funding and SMUD’s affirmative 
action program was found unconstitutional.105 Thus, although there is an 
exception to Proposition 209’s ban on discrimination and preferences for 
programs required to maintain federal funding, the state is required to 
comply with both federal law and Proposition 209, if possible.106
 
IV.  THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES PREDICTED BY PROPOSITION 209’S 
OPPONENTS HAVE FAILED TO MATERIALIZE 
 
A.  Most of California’s Public Agencies Voluntarily Brought Their 
Policies into Compliance with Proposition 209 
 
Prior to the passage of Proposition 209, some officials and scholars 
promised that if adopted, the amendment would be ignored.107 For 
example, the current California Attorney General, Bill Lockyer, refused 
to enforce Proposition 209 and demanded that the California Supreme 
Court interpret the amendment to dilute the prohibitions against 
“granting preferences based on race or sex.”108 Then San Francisco 
Mayor, Willie Brown, stated that he would ignore the new amendment to 
the state constitution and provoked the amendment’s enforcers by saying 
 102. Id. The program’s requirements included attendance at a SMUD affirmative action 
program briefing, requesting “assistance from SMUD’s affirmative action program office, 
identifying specified units of work that improve the likelihood of subcontracting,” and contacting 
potential minority subcontractors no less than 10 days before the proposal due date. Contractors 
were then required to contact minority subcontractors a second time “to determine with certainty 
whether they were interested in performing the specific work on the project.”  Id. 
 103. Id. at 723. See also 49 C.F.R. § 21.7(a)(1) (2004) (requiring assurance of compliance 
with Department of Transportation regulations to apply for Federal financial assistance). 
 104. C&C Constr., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 732. 
 105. Id. at 733. 
 106. Id. at 733 n.10 (“SMUD’s compliance with [Proposition 209] is not preempted by the 
federal regulations if SMUD can comply with both [Proposition 209] and the federal regulations.”). 
 107. Gail Heriot, supra note 24, at 168-169. 
 108. See Kevin Yamamura, Group: Lockyer ‘shirked duty’ on 209, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 
6, 2001, at A3; Adam Sparks, California’s War on Prop. 209 View from the Right, S.F. GATE, 
available at, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2002/12/02/asparks.DTL&hw =sparks 
+209&sn=003&sc=714 (Dec. 2, 2002) (last accessed Oct. 3, 2005). 
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“so sue me.”109
In 1998, two years after the passage of Proposition 209, Pacific 
Legal Foundation (PLF), a conservative think tank, examined 
compliance with the new constitutional amendment.110 Despite the 
threats and promises of some public officials vowing to ignore 
Proposition 209, the majority of local governments, municipalities, and 
special districts throughout California complied with Proposition 209 
soon after its adoption.111
The employment policies of eighty-five of California’s state and 
local government agencies were examined by the 1998 study.112 After 
PLF’s study began, a California appellate court struck down “aspirational 
goals” because of the pressure they put on government officials to hire 
based on race and sex.113 Compliance with Proposition 209 was 79%, 
assuming agencies surveyed changed their policies to comply with the 
court’s decision.114 If none of those agencies changed their policies then 
compliance may be as low as 32%.115 The study identified “41 state 
agencies that had goals and timetables for the hiring and promotion of 
minorities and women prior to the decision in Connerly.”116 Among the 
eleven clearly identified violators were the City of Berkeley and the 
County of Los Angeles.117 After the decision in Connerly, most agencies 
replied that they would no longer maintain goals and timetables due to 
the decision.118 Thus, the majority of California’s state employers 
complied with Proposition 209 a short time after it was adopted. 
In the same study, approximately 88% of public school districts were 
found in compliance with Proposition 209.119 Of the 112 school districts 
 109. Sparks, supra note 108. 
 110. TRAVIS J. LINDSEY, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION’S OPERATION END BIAS PROGRAM: 
SUMMARY REPORT (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Pacific Legal Foundation and copy 
on file with author). Pacific Legal Foundation did a random sampling of more than 100 California 
cities, counties and special districts to determine compliance with Proposition 209. Id. at 1. Public 
Records Act requests were sent requesting information concerning programs that take into account 
the race or sex of an individual. See id. at 3. 
 111. See id. at 19. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 13. 
 114. Id. at 19. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. The Connerly decision found that hiring and promotion goals and timetables that 
made classifications based on race and sex were unconstitutional, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 
3d 2001). If state and local government agencies changed their policies after the decision in 
Connerly, then compliance is around 79%. However, if none of those agencies changed their policies 
then compliance may be as low as 32%. 
 117. Lindsey, supra note 110, at 14-16. There are twenty-seven agencies that appear to 
comply with Proposition 209, including the City of Los Angeles. Id. at 18. 
 118. Id. at 18. 
 119. Id. at 19. 
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examined in a study conducted by the PLF, only nine were found in 
violation of Proposition 209 and four school districts had policies that 
potentially violated Proposition 209.120 While ninety-nine school districts 
were found in compliance, only fifteen of those districts were closely 
examined; the others were surveyed “only by the information found on 
their websites.”121 Although only nine districts were found in violation of 
Proposition 209, some of the largest districts in the state, such as Los 
Angeles Unified School District, had programs or policies that were 
likely in violation of Proposition 209.122
The PLF study also found that 71% of the forty-five government 
entities examined for their participation in public contracting complied 
with Proposition 209.123 Five of the government entities were identified 
as violators and seven were identified as potential violators of 
Proposition 209.124 Again, the County of Los Angeles is among the 
identified violators of Proposition 209.125 However, thirty-two of the 
forty-five agencies examined appear to comply with Proposition 209.126
For those agencies and districts that chose not to voluntarily comply 
with Proposition 209, California citizens are able to enforce the 
requirements of the amendment in the courts. As discussed in Section II, 
supra, Proposition 209 has been enforced in the courts through lawsuits 
challenging the agencies that put discriminatory or preferential programs 
into place.127
 
 
 
 
 120. Id. Identified violators are those government entities that implement policies which 
violate Proposition 209 on their face. Potential violators are those government entities that have 
generated complaints from concerned citizens regarding possible violations of Proposition 209, but 
that have race- and sex-neutral policies. There are over 350 school districts in the state of California. 
California School Districts with Web Servers, available at, http://www.slocoe.org/resource/calpage 
1.htm (last accessed October 19, 2005). 
 121. Lindsey, supra note 110, at 19. 
 122. Id. Some of the policies implemented by school districts in violation of Proposition 209 
have been effectively challenged and enjoined by court action. See, e.g., Crawford v. Huntington 
Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2003). 
 123. Lindsey, supra note 110, at 19. 
 124. Id. at 4-8. 
 125. Id. at 4. The County of Los Angeles has goals and timetables for minority and female 
participation in contracting and also a “county-wide aspirational goal of 25% minority, women, 
disadvantaged and disabled veteran-owned firm participation.” Id. 
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. See, e.g., Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068 (Cal. 2000); 
C&C Constr., Inc. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715 (Cal Ct. App. 3d 2004); 
Connerly v. State Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2001); Crawford, 121 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 96. 
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B.  Proposition 209 Has Not Adversely Affected the Public Employment 
or Labor Market Position of Women and Minorities 
 
Before Proposition 209 was passed, some scholars believed it would 
lead to a “deterioration in the labor market position of the African-
American and Hispanic communities and on the labor market position of 
women generally.”128 Professor Chemerinsky pointed to the success of 
affirmative action programs in increasing the employment of women and 
minorities, especially in more senior or higher paying positions.129 
Chemerinsky also feared that Proposition 209 would eliminate outreach 
programs with increased advertising for job openings in places 
frequented by women and minorities.130 However, the fears that the 
position of women and minorities would deteriorate did not materialize. 
Women and minorities have maintained their levels in the public work 
force, including those with jobs at higher salary levels.131 There has been 
no increase in the overall unemployment rate of women and minorities 
and their labor market position has remained relatively unchanged 
compared to pre-Proposition 209 levels.132
Proposition 209 did not cause the number of women and minorities 
in more senior or higher paying positions to decline, and women have 
been able to maintain their levels in the public work force. According to 
Professor Chemerinsky, “[t]he composition of the public work force at 
higher salary levels” consisted of more than 90% white employees in 
1975, and because of programs involving preferential treatment of 
minorities, less than 70% of employees at higher salary levels were white 
in 1993.133 In 1975, the year after Governor Reagan designated the 
 128. Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1008. 
 129. Id. See also CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION IN CALIFORNIA 35 (Mar. 1995) (reporting that the composition Asians, African-Americans 
and Hispanics in the public work force at the higher salary levels went from 3% or less per group in 
1975 to 9.3% or greater per group in 1993). 
 130. Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1008. 
 131. See ELIAS S. LOPEZ, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, THE COMPOSITION OF STAFF IN 
CALIFORNIA’S COMMUNITY COLLEGES, 1994 TO 2002 13 (2004) (reporting data provided by the 
California Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office); ELIAS S. LOPEZ & REFUGIO I. ROCHIN, 
CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY FACULTY: 1985 TO 2001 20-23, 
32-37 (2003); ELIAS S. LOPEZ & BELINDA REYES, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, FACULTY, 
MANAGERS, AND ADMINISTRATORS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 1996 TO 2002 87 (2004) 
(analyzing data provided by the University of California Office of the President obtained by 
legislative request). 
 132. See Data obtained from the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY AGE, GENDER, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1981-2003 
ANNUAL AVERAGES; U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 2003 EEO-1 
AGGREGATE REPORT CA, available at, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/2003/state/6.html (last 
accessed July 12, 2005). 
 133. See Chemerinsky, supra, note 21, at 1007 (citing CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, 
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implementation of California’s affirmative action program, the 
percentage of Asian-Americans, African-Americans, and Hispanics at 
higher salary levels was 3% or less per group, compared to 9.9%, 9.3%, 
and 11.7% respectively in 1993.134  These numbers suggest that more 
minorities were able to find jobs at higher salary levels after California 
implemented its affirmative action plan. 
Since Proposition 209, minorities have maintained their levels of 
employment in jobs at higher salary levels. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission reports that in 2003, 61.4% of those employed 
as professionals were white, compared to 38.6% who were minorities.135 
Of those employed as officials and managers, 71.3% were white and 
28.7% were minorities.136 Although there is still some disparity between 
whites and minorities in public employment, it does not appear that 
minorities have lost any ground since 1993, before Proposition 209 was 
adopted. The overall percentages of minority employees in the higher 
salary levels have not changed significantly since the adoption of 
Proposition 209.137
Opponents of the amendment also believed that women and 
minorities were more dependent upon public employers because of their 
preferential hiring policies.138 Because of this dependence, Barbara 
Bergman predicted that the “loss of affirmative action programs in the 
public sector could be expected to increase” the overall unemployment 
rate of African-Americans by more than one percentage point and that 
“[u]nemployment rates for Hispanics and women of all races would also 
rise.”139 Rather than the increase in unemployment predicted by 
Proposition 209’s critics, California’s unemployment statistics show a 
decrease in unemployment rates for women and minorities, even 
immediately after the adoption of Proposition 209.140 While Proposition 
209 is not likely the cause of the decrease in unemployment for 
THE STATUS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CALIFORNIA 25 (Mar. 1995)). 
 134. Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1007. 
 135. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 2003 EEO-1 AGGREGATE 
REPORT CA, available at, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/2003/state/6.html (last accessed July 12, 
2005) (reporting that in 2003, there were 800,139 workers employed as professional and 308,455 of 
them were minorities). 
 136. Id. (reporting 492,269 employees working as officials and managers, and 141,220 of their 
employees were minorities). 
 137. Id.; CAL. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN 
CALIFORNIA 25 (Mar. 1995). 
 138. Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1008. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Data obtained from the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY AGE, GENDER, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1981-2003 ANNUAL 
AVERAGES. Between 1995 and 1997 the unemployment rate for blacks and Hispanics fell by 1.3% 
and 1.8%, respectively. See Figure 1. 
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minorities (whites have also experienced a slight decrease in 
unemployment during the same time period), Proposition 209 did not 
cause an increase in unemployment rates for minorities as predicted by 
those opposed to the amendment. 
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Figure 1. Data obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 
 
Between 1995 and 2003, the unemployment rate of blacks in 
California decreased by 1.2%, the same percentage decrease in 
unemployment rate experienced by whites in California.141 For 
Hispanics, the unemployment rate fell by an even greater percentage, 
dropping 3.3% between 1995 and 2003.142 During the same time period, 
the unemployment rate for white, black, and Hispanic women decreased 
by 1.3%, 2.7%, and 3.3%, respectively.143 According to the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, in 2003, 45.7% of all employees 
in the state of California were women.144 In 2003, more minority workers 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 2003 EEO-1 AGGREGATE 
  
103] DID THE SKY REALLY FALL? 123 
 
than white workers were employed in the state of California, reflecting 
the diverse racial demographics of the state.145 These figures are hardly 
consistent with the suggestion that Proposition 209 would be devastating, 
or even detrimental, to the labor market position of women and 
minorities. 
The ominous predictions of the deterioration in labor market position 
for women and minorities are unfounded. Some of the largest employers 
in the public sector are state universities and colleges, which employed 
36.5% of all state employees during the 2002-03 fiscal year.146 In 2004, 
the California Research Bureau study on the composition of staff in 
California Community Colleges showed no deterioration of the labor 
market position of minorities or women in California Community 
Colleges compared to 1994 (pre-Proposition 209).147 In fact, the 
percentage of Latino educational administrators increased from 11% in 
1994 to 14% in 2002.148 The percentage of African-Americans working 
as educational administrators has remained somewhat constant, 
decreasing slightly by 0.8% from 1994 to 2002.149 As shown in Figure 2, 
the total number of Latinos, Asians, and African-Americans promoted or 
newly hired as educational administrators increased for each group 
between 1995 and 2002; however, the total number of whites promoted 
or newly hired increased by more than two-fold.150 In 1995 there were 
twenty-six newly hired or promoted Latinos compared to thirty-nine in 
2002.151 The numbers are similar for African-Americans, with twenty 
promotions and new hires in 1995 compared to thirty-five promotions 
and new hires in 2002.152  Although it is encouraging that the community 
college system continues to hire and promote members of minority 
REPORT CA, available at, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/2003/state/6.html (last accessed July 12, 
2005). 
 145. See id. In 2003, there were 2,077,483 white employees and 2,145,273 minority 
employees. 
 146. Department of Finance, Economic Research Unit, Employees in California State 
Government 1975-76 to 2002-03, available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/html/fs%5Fdata/stat%2Dabs 
/tables/c5.xls (last accessed July 13, 2005). Out of 321,394 total people employed by the state of 
California in 2002-03, 118,289 of them were employed either by state colleges or the University of 
California system. Id. 
 147. ELIAS S. LOPEZ, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, THE COMPOSITION OF STAFF IN 
CALIFORNIA’S COMMUNITY COLLEGES, 1994 TO 2002 13 (2004) (reporting data provided by the 
California Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. In 1994, 11% of educational administrators were African-American. The year 
Proposition 209 was passed, 10% of educational administrators were African-American. In 1999, 
three years after Proposition 209 went into effect, the number rose to 12%. In 2002, 10% of 
educational administrators were African-American. 
 150. Id. at 15. 
 151. Id. See Figure 2. 
 152. LOPEZ, supra note 145, at 15. 
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groups as educational administrators, the community college system 
apparently hired and promoted primarily white educational 
administrators between the years 1995 and 2002.153 The hiring of 
educational administrators by the community college system is one area 
where the percentages of minorities have significantly declined. The 
elimination of race- and sex-based affirmative action programs is likely a 
factor in this decline. 
 
CCC Statewide Promotions and New Hires 
Educational Administrators by Ethnicity, 1995-2002
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Figure 2. Data compiled by California Research Bureau 
 The numbers are encouraging for female educational administrators. 
The hiring and promotion of women at community colleges increased by 
2% from 1995 to 2002, and currently 51% of newly hired or promoted 
educational administrators are female.154 There are still significant wage 
gaps between males and females; however, the differences are minimal 
between ethnic groups.155 The difference between men and women likely 
reflects an age difference rather than a difference based on 
discrimination.156
 This success is not only true for educational administrators at 
California Community Colleges, but for tenured faculty as well. Figure 3 
demonstrates that between 1994 and 2002, the percentage of tenured 
faculty who were Latino, Asian, African-American, or Native American 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 14. 
 155. Id. at 18. The median annual salary for educational administrators in 2002 was $99,807 
for females and $103,302 for males. 
 156. Id. (“This gender difference may reflect the age difference between males and females.”) 
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increased by 4.3%.157 During the same period the percentage of tenured 
female faculty members increased by 5.4%.158 Although the California 
Research Bureau points out that the composition of tenured faculty is 
changing “not so much through the promotion and hiring process,” but 
because “[a]s White males retire, the overall percentages for all the other 
groups increase,” women and minorities are certainly not losing any 
ground.159 The increased percentage of minority and women educators is 
encouraging. 
 
CCC Tenured Faculty by Ethnicity, 1994 and 2002
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Figure 3. Data compiled by California Research Bureau 
 Similarly, the employment of women and minorities is increasing in 
the California State University system.160 The percentage of female CSU 
faculty increased from 31% in 1985 to 44% in 2001.161 From 1985 to 
2001, the percentage of Latino faculty members rose from 4.0% to 
6.7%.162 African-American faculty members also saw an increase, from 
2.8% to 4.0%.163 Although these increases are quite modest, they reflect 
a positive trend, rather than “the deterioration in the labor market 
position of the African-American and Hispanic communities,” or on the 
labor market position of women in general, predicted by Proposition 
209’s opponents.164
 
 
 157. Id. at 19. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 9. 
 160. See ELIAS S. LOPEZ & REFUGIO I. ROCHIN, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, 
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY FACULTY: 1985 TO 2001, at 20-23, 32-37 (2003). 
 161. Id. at 20. 
 162. Id. at 22. See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Data compiled by the California State Research Bureau 
 Compared to the California State University and the California 
Community Colleges, the employees at the University of California are 
the least diverse as measured by number of females, Latinos, and 
African-Americans. Still, a few campuses in the University of California 
system increased the number of females among their tenured and tenured 
track faculties by over 30% between 1996 and 2002 – without race- or 
sex-conscious affirmative action or outreach programs.165 Minorities 
have also continued to improve their positions as tenured and tenure 
track faculty members despite the adoption of Proposition 209.166
 It could be argued that the absence of any negative effect on hiring in 
some universities may be due to the failure of some universities to 
 
 163. LOPEZ & ROCHIN, supra note 131, at 22. 
 164. Chemerinsky, supra at note 21, at 1008. 
 165. ELIAS S. LOPEZ & BELINDA REYES, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH BUREAU, FACULTY, 
MANAGERS, AND ADMINISTRATORS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 1996 TO 2002 87 (2004) 
(analyzing data provided by the University of California Office of the President obtained by 
legislative request). 
 166. Id. at 87-88. The number of Latino tenured and tenure track professors grew by at least 
33% between 1996 and 2002 at UC Santa Barbara and UC Santa Cruz. At UC Davis, UC Irvine and 
UC Riverside, the number of Asian tenured and tenure track faculty increased by over 45% between 
1996 and 2002. UC Managers and Administrators “have also become more diverse. Id. at 88. The 
number of female high-level managers increased by 40[%] from 1996 to 2002. In 2002, females 
comprised 40[%] of all Managers and Administrators.” Id. Only 2.4% of tenured and tenure track 
faculty at UC schools were African-American in 2002, compared to 2.8% in 1996, showing a slight 
decrease overall. Id. at 13. The total number of African-American tenured and tenure track faculty 
remained essentially the same, increasing from 164 in 1996 to 167 in 2002. Id. 
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comply with Proposition 209 in hiring and promotion decisions.167 
Schools such as UCLA and UC Davis continue to have affirmative 
action policies; however their policies are focused on the increased 
advertisement of job openings to a broader range of potential women and 
minority candidates, which is not overtly in violation of Proposition 
209.168 UCLA and UC Davis temper their affirmative action policies by 
explicitly prohibiting the use of discrimination or preferences in hiring 
decisions, which would be in clear violation of Proposition 209.169 
Outreach programs are permissible under Proposition 209 as long as they 
do not discriminate or give preference based on race or sex. Thus, 
women and minorities have maintained their ability to obtain public 
employment at colleges and universities without hiring policies that 
violate the law. 
 
C.  The Overall Impact of Proposition 209 on Women and Minorities in 
Higher Education Has Been Minimal 
 
 Proposition 209’s opponents had dire predictions for the higher 
education of women and minorities if the amendment was adopted to 
eliminate discrimination and preferential treatment.170 Some feared that 
Proposition 209 would abolish programs such as women’s resource 
centers that provide workshops on self-defense, rape prevention, and 
sexual harassment.171 However, this particular fear is unfounded for most 
women’s resource centers because Proposition 209 is not triggered so 
 167. See, e.g., UCLA ACADEMIC AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN, available at 
http://faculty.diversity.ucla.edu/affirmative_action/docs/2004-2005%20AAP.pdf (last accessed July 
6, 2005); UC DAVIS POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL, SECTION 380-10 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN 
EMPLOYMENT, available at http://manuals.ucdavis.edu/ppm/380/380-10.htm (last accessed July 6, 
2005). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. See UCLA Affirmative Action Plan, supra note 165 at 39; See also UC Davis Policy, 
supra note 165 at VI. For example, UC Davis “commits itself to apply every good faith effort to 
achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities and women in all segments of its workforce where 
deficiencies exist.” Id. at 380-10 § III (A). Part of this commitment includes goal setting, special 
outreach efforts, and reporting reasons for not interviewing or selecting those candidates who are not 
hired. Id. at § VI (A)(2). These policies are not clearly in violation of Proposition 209, but may be in 
violation if they result in preferences for women and minorities in hiring and promotions. See Hi-
Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1084-85 (Cal. 2000); Connerly v. State 
Pers. Bd., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 2001) (“[T]he requirement to create timetables to 
seek, hire, and promote minorities and women and to make reasonable progress in doing so-with 
financial incentives for success and financial detriment for failure-establishes impermissible racial 
and gender preferences.”). 
 170. See Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1009 (explaining that Proposition 209 would have a 
“devastating effect” on college admissions and outreach programs for minorities). 
 171. See Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1011. 
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long as the program is open to men and women alike.172 Because 
Proposition 209 eliminated the use of preferences based on race and sex, 
the University of California changed the focus of many of its outreach 
programs. The UC system has “taken action to strengthen K-12 
education, enhance student preparation for higher education, and 
implement race-neutral initiatives designed to strengthen its ability to 
attract, admit, and enroll an undergraduate student body that is both 
academically well prepared and reflective of the broad diversity of 
California.”173 All students, regardless of race or sex, will benefit from 
policies designed to prepare them for college. 
 In 1995, Cynthia Lee predicted that the percentage of Latino college 
students would drop from 18.4% to 5%-6.6% and the percentage of 
African-American students would fall from 6.9% to 1.5%-1.8% without 
race based outreach programs at the University of California Los 
Angeles.174 Although the number of minority students in the University 
of California system did decrease after Proposition 209, it was not nearly 
as drastic as predicted by Proposition 209’s opponents. As shown in 
Figure 5, the overall percent change in admissions of underrepresented 
minority students at the University of California decreased by only 1% 
between the years 1995 and 2000.175
 Although the more prestigious schools saw a significant decrease in 
admissions of underrepresented minorities similar to that predicted by 
Proposition 209’s opponents, UC Santa Cruz and UC Riverside saw a 
drastic increase in admissions of underrepresented minorities.176 Students 
are being admitted on the strength of their credentials. UC Santa Cruz 
and UC Riverside continue to enroll a strong percentage of 
underrepresented minority students.177
 172. See Volokh, supra note 23, at 1385. 
 173. NINA ROBINSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT STUDENT 
ACADEMIC SERVICES, UNDERGRADUATE ACCESS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AFTER THE 
ELIMINATION OF RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES 8 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.ucop.edu/sas 
/publish/aa_finalcx.pdf (last accessed May 23, 2005). 
 174. Cynthia Lee, Scholars, Foes of Affirmative Action Face Off on Issues, UCLA TODAY, 
June, 9 1995, at 3. 
 175. JOSE ATILIO HERNANDEZ, SELECT COMMITTEE ON COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS AND OUTREACH, ADMISSIONS GRANTED: THE FUTURE OF UC ADMISSIONS POLICIES 3 
(2001), available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/SEN/COMMITTEE/SELECT/COLLEGE/_home/ 
PUBLICATON/BACKGROUND7-12-01.pdf (last accessed May 24, 2005) (analyzing admissions 
data from the University of California, Office of the President, Nov. 2000). Underrepresented 
students were defined as those of Chicano/Latino and African-American descent. 
 176. Id. Admissions of underrepresented minorities at UCLA and UC Berkeley fell 45% and 
42%, respectively. Admissions of underrepresented minorities at UC Santa Cruz and UC Riverside 
increased 27% and 87% respectively. 
 177. Enrollment statistics for UC Santa Cruz are available at http://www.ucsc.edu/about 
/statistics.asp. Enrollment figures for UC Riverside are available at http://ucrapb.ucr.edu 
m/institutional_planning/institutional_planning.htm. In 2004, 18% of undergraduate students at UC 
Santa Cruz were underrepresented minorities and nearly 31% of the undergraduate students at UC 
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November 2000 
 
 By ensuring that minority students would be admitted only to those 
schools at which their entering credentials match those of white and 
Asian students, Proposition 209 facilitated the improvement of minority 
students’ performance in the colleges/universities they are attending. For 
example, at UC Berkeley, the six-year or less graduation rate of African-
American and Hispanic freshmen entering in the fall of 1998, increased 
 
Riverside were underrepresented minorities. 
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by 6.5% and 4.9%, respectively, compared to the graduation rates of 
their peers just two years earlier, before Proposition 209 was in effect.178 
At UC San Diego, the average freshman GPAs for minorities all but 
converged with the GPAs of white and Asian students, just one year after 
Proposition 209 was implemented.179 Although other factors may play a 
role in this trend, the data shows that minority students are capable of 
high academic achievement equal to that of their white and Asian peers 
when admission is based on academic credentials rather than racial 
preferences. 
 The CSU system experienced a similar effect on admissions after the 
adoption of Proposition 209.180 From 1995 to 2004, the enrollment of 
white, non-Latino students decreased significantly by 4.0%.181 African-
American and Asian-American enrollment decreased slightly by 0.7% 
and 0.9% respectively.182 The enrollment of Hispanic students increased 
significantly by 4.7%.183
 Proposition 209 recognizes the importance of allowing students to 
succeed on their own credentials. When students are competing with 
those who have equal qualifications, their grades improve and attrition 
rates decrease.184 In addition, elimination of race and sex preferences 
removes the stigma that minority and female students were admitted to 
prestigious schools for reasons other than the strength of their academic 
achievements.185 Although fewer minority students may be admitted into 
 178. OFFICE OF STUDENT RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, FRESHMAN 
SIX-YEAR GRADUATION RATES BY ALL ETHNIC CATEGORIES, FALL COHORTS, available at 
https://osr2.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/Access/DB/Programs/handlesql2.pl (last accessed October 19, 
2005). 
 179. Heriot, supra note 2416, at 171-72 n. 163. Heriot cites the Univ. of Cal. San Diego, 
Academic Performance Report, which announced that “underrepresented students admitted to UC 
San Diego in 1998 substantially outperformed their 1997 counterparts” and the “majority/minority 
performance gap observed in past studies was narrowed considerably.” There were “no substantial 
GPA differences based on race-ethnicity” in the 1998-99 school year.
 180. CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, STATISTICAL REPORTS, CSU NEW STUDENT 
ENROLLMENTS, available at http://www.calstate.edu/as/stat_reports/2004-2005/feth01.htm (last 
accessed July 6, 2005). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. California State University divides statistics for Hispanic students into two categories, 
Mexican American and Other Latino. The enrollment of Mexican-Americans increased by 4.9% and 
the enrollment of other Latino students increased by 2%. These categories were combined to 
produce the figure of 6.9% represented in the text above. 
 184. Heriot, supra at 24, at 172; OFFICE OF STUDENT RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, CURRENT SIX-YEAR GRADUATION RATES, NEW FRESHMEN, FALL 1998 
COHORT, available at http://osr.berkeley.edu/Public/STUDENT.DATA/current_grad_rate.html (last 
accessed May 19, 2005). 
 185. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“Classifications 
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial 
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial 
hostility.”) (citing Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.)); see also 
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the most prestigious schools in the short-term, the long-term benefits of 
Proposition 209 may prove to outweigh the short-term costs of 
temporarily decreased minority admissions in the state’s more 
competitive schools. 
 
D.  K-12 Education has Gained Greater Significance 
 One of the goals of Proposition 209 was to “address the inequality of 
opportunity . . . by making sure that all California children are provided 
with the tools to compete in our society.”186 The League of California 
Cities suggested that government agencies ensure equal opportunity in 
public education by expanding their outreach programs to all children.187 
Some of the recommendations included developing “academic support 
programs and financial aid services for students from low-income 
backgrounds, who are first generation college students, who attend high 
schools with a low eligibility rate for post-secondary institutions, and/or 
whose high schools have a low college and university participation 
rate.”188 The UC Links program at UC Berkeley prepares K-12 students 
for college life and focuses on children from lower-income families.189 
The University of California system now offers many race-neutral 
programs for individual “students who are disadvantaged or attend low 
performing schools,” including Early Academic Outreach Programs; 
Mathematics, Engineering, and Science Achievement; Puente; and Fast 
Forward to the University of California at Berkeley.190 San Diego school 
districts are emphasizing advanced course work for all students and 
placing a greater emphasis on “aligning community college degree 
requirements with entrance requirements to four-year institutions” in an 
effort to “increase educational opportunities for students or members of 
groups historically underrepresented at four-year colleges and 
universities.”191 These types of race- and sex-neutral programs are in 
L. Darnell Weeden, After Grutter v. Bollinger Higher Education Must Keep its Eyes on the Tainted 
Diversity Prize Legacy, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 161, 161-62 (2004) (“Because race-based diversity policy 
promotes notions of racial superiority and racial inferiority, a race-based diversity program is 
inherently flawed.”). 
 186. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION at 32 (Argument in Favor of 
Proposition 209) (Nov. 5, 1996). 
 187. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, ANALYSIS OF STEPS THAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
CAN TAKE TO ENSURE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC CONTRACTING, EDUCATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT 4-5, available at, http://www.cacities.org/resource_files/newCybrary/2002/legal 
resource/11449_LR.Young—mofo%20letter.doc (last accessed July 15, 2005). 
 188. Id. at 5. 
 189. See www.uclinks.org. 
 190. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: 
RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, Washington, D.C., 2004, available at, 
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edlite-raceneutralreport2.html (last accessed Aug. 27, 2005). 
 191. Id. 
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harmony with the requirements of Proposition 209 because they do not 
consider the race or sex of the students.192
 The graduation rates of California’s high school students steadily 
increased after the passage of Proposition 209, as shown in Figure 6. 
According to the California Department of Education, the California 
High School completion rate reached a low point of 64% during the 
1994-95 year (the year before Proposition 209 was adopted), after 
dropping from 68.6% in 1991-92.193 In the following years, the high 
school graduation rate crept back up to 69.6% in 2001-02.194 A report 
based on data from the California Department of Education shows that 
the graduation rate of all minority students increased in each ethnic 
group between the years 1995-96 and 2001-02.195 The low percentage of 
students that graduate with a high school diploma is discouraging, but it 
requires providing all students with the tools they need, regardless of 
race or sex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (a)(2005). 
 193. CALIFORNIA’S GRADUATION RATE: THE HIDDEN CRISIS 4 (WestEd 2004), available at, 
http://www.wested.org/cs/we/view/rs/752 (last accessed July 15, 2005) (using the California 
Department of Education’s annual basic completion ratio to calculate the completion rate). This 
report notes that calculating graduation rates is complicated because students do not have individual 
identifiers so they are not accurately tracked from grade to grade or school to school. Id. at 1. Thus, 
different methods of calculating graduation rates yield different results. Id. 
 194. Id. at 4. 
 195. Id. at 6 (graduation rates determined using the California Department of Education’s 
basic completion ratio). The graduation rate of Asians increased from 88.4% to 88.8%, Hispanics 
and African-American students both increased from 54.0% to 58.4%. 
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 The graduation rates of California’s minority students were above 
the national average in 2001.196 In California, 82.0% of Asian students 
graduated in 2001, compared to 76.8% of Asian students nationally.197 
Fifty-seven percent of Hispanic students in California graduated in 2001, 
compared to 53.2% nationally.198 California’s black students beat the 
national graduation rate by 5.1% in 2001, with 55.3% of California’s 
black students graduating from high school.199 Although the average 
graduation rates of Hispanic and black students are not yet as high as 
those of white students, California’s minority students are obtaining their 
high school diplomas at a greater rate than minority students nationally. 
 196. Id. at 5 (reporting data from the Urban Institute on California’s 2001 Overall Graduation 
Rates (%) by Race/Ethnicity Compared to National Average, and calculating graduation rates using 
the Cumulative Promotion Index). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. The graduation rate of California’s American Indian students is also included in this 
data. California’s American Indian students rank slightly below the national average of 51.1%, with 
a graduation rate of 49.7%. 
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200 Minority students will most likely continue to improve as they are 
provided with the tools they need to overcome circumstances such as 
poverty and succeed in our society. 
 
E.  Women and Minority Businesses Continue to be Competitive in 
Public Contracting 
 
 Opponents of Proposition 209 feared that removing goals and targets 
set for increasing contracts with businesses owned by minorities and 
women would stifle any future advances for these businesses. For 
example, Chemerinsky stated, “[T]he goals and targets set to cure 
discrimination in public contracting are not quotas. . . . However, 
statistics show that goals and targets have made an enormous difference. 
These benefits and future advances would be lost if the CCRI 
[Proposition 209] is adopted.”201 California’s target was for 15% of the 
contracts to be given to minority business enterprises, and not less than 
5% to be given to business enterprises owned by women.202
 Cities and counties spend a large portion of their funds awarding 
contracts to private businesses. For example, the City of San Francisco, 
which grants preferences in contracting to minority- and women-owned 
businesses,203 awards an average of 41,065 contracts each year, worth 
approximately $568,859,634.204 If just 1% of that goes to administering 
affirmative action programs, then over $5,000,000 is being spent on 
programs that promote discrimination and preferential treatment based 
on race and sex. Recently, the Civil Grand Jury for the City and County 
of San Francisco investigated San Francisco’s contracting policies.205 
The Grand Jury found that San Francisco’s procedures for determining 
eligibility in contracting contained race and sex preferences in violation 
of the law and may very well expose San Francisco to legal and financial 
 200. Id. The graduation rate for California’s white students is 75.7%, just barely above the 
national average of 74.9%. 
 201. Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1013 (citing statistics showing that after the 
implementation of goals and timetables at the California Department of General Services in 1992-93, 
the number of contracts given to minority businesses rose to 10.1%, up from 0.52% in 1989-90). 
 202. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10115 (West 1996). 
 203. Petitioner’s Dec. of Virginia Harmon in support of Request for Discretionary Stay of 
Injunction or, in the alternative, Order Shortening Time at 2, Coral Constr., Inc. v. Martin, Nos. 319-
549 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of S.F. Aug. 12, 2004); REPORT OF THE 2004-2005 CIVIL GRAND JURY 
FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CITY CONTRACTING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2, 
available at, http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploaded files/courts/HRC.pdf (last accessed July 14, 2005). 
 204. Petitioner’s Dec. of Virginia Harmon in support of Request for Discretionary Stay of 
Injunction or, in the alternative, Order Shortening Time at 2, Coral Constr., Inc. v. Martin, Nos. 319-
549 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of S.F. Aug. 12, 2004). 
 205. REPORT OF 2004-2005 CIVIL GRAND JURY FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, CITY CONTRACTING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 2, supra note 203. 
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risks.206 San Francisco is spending millions of dollars to violate the state 
constitution by creating incentives to grant preferences to minority- and 
women-owned businesses and then spending additional public funds to 
defend its policies.207
 In contrast to cities like San Francisco, some state agencies have 
implemented new policies to help businesses succeed without relying on 
race or sex based criteria. For instance, the California Department of 
General Services offers a 5% bid preference on solicitations from small 
businesses.208 Additionally, outreach programs that require contractors to 
provide Minority Business Enterprises, Women Business Enterprises, 
and other business enterprises an equal opportunity to compete for and 
participate in the performance of city contracts also conform to the 
requirements of Proposition 209.209 Any potential ground perceived as 
lost by minorities and women can be recovered by implementing 
programs which do not use race- and sex-based criteria. 
 
V.  CALIFORNIA’S APPROACH COULD BE ADOPTED BY OTHER STATES 
TO ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION AND PREFERENCES NATIONWIDE 
 
 California is the only state that has amended its constitution to 
eliminate discrimination and preferences based on race and sex. A 
handful of states have considered bills and initiatives similar to 
California’s Proposition 209.210
 The state of Washington was the second state to eliminate state 
discrimination and preferential treatment based on race and sex, by 
adopting a state statute rather than by constitutional amendment. In 
 206. Id at 8. 
 207. See Petitioner’s Dec. of Virginia Harmon in support of Request for Discretionary Stay of 
Injunction or, in the alternative, Order Shortening Time at 2, Coral Constr., Inc. v. Martin, Nos. 319-
549 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of S.F. Aug. 12, 2004) (stating that San Francisco awards an average of 
41,065 contracts each year, worth approximately $568,859,634); Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. 
City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1084 (Cal. 2000). (“The relevant constitutional consideration is that 
they are compelled to contact MBE’s/WBE’s, which are thus accorded preferential treatment within 
the meaning of section 31.”); REPORT OF 2004-2005 CIVIL GRAND JURY FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 203, at 7 (finding that the city of San Francisco paid outside counsel 
$288,998 for its participation in the Coral case, the time of the City Attorney’s Office, and likely 
attorneys’ fees for Coral’s attorneys). 
 208. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 14835 - 14836 (2005); see also SMALL BUSINESS CERTIFICATION 
BENEFITS AND ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS, CAL. DEPT. GENERAL SERVICES, available at 
http://www.pd.dgs.ca.gov/smbus/sbcert.htm (last accessed Oct. 20, 2005). 
 209. Domar Elec., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 885 P.2d 934 (1994) (cited approvingly by Hi-
Voltage, 12 P.3d at 1085). 
 210. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1999); Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, available at, 
http://www.michigancivilrights.org; Op. to Att’y. Gen. re. Amendment to Bar Government from 
Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, 778 So.2d 888, 896 (July 13, 2000); 
TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 261 
(Oxford University Press 2004). 
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November 1998, the Washington voters passed Initiative 200 by 58% to 
eliminate discrimination and preferences.211 The state statute contains 
language nearly identical to Proposition 209.212The Washington Supreme 
Court interpreted the scope of the Washington state statute slightly more 
narrowly than Proposition 209 is interpreted in California;213 and a state 
statute does not change the organic state law like a constitutional 
amendment such as Proposition 209.214
 Shortly after the passage of Proposition 209 in California, the 
Houston City Council voted on Proposition A, an initiative proposing to 
ban “affirmative action for minorities and women” in contracting and 
hiring.215 The original language of Proposition A was patterned after 
Proposition 209, to eliminate discrimination and preferential treatment.216 
However, framing the question put to the voters with the more 
politically-charged term “affirmative action” led to the defeat of the 
proposition “by ten percentage points, with the highest proportion of 
blacks showing up at the polls in Houston’s history.”217
 Attempts were also made in Florida to include an initiative similar to 
Proposition 209 on the November 2000 ballot, but there was little 
political support for such an initiative in Florida.218 After the initiative 
gained enough pre-ballot signatures and qualified for the ballot, the 
Florida Supreme Court did a pre-ballot review and found that the 
initiative violated the single subject rule.219 However, Governor Jeb Bush 
 211. Id. 
 212. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1999). Rather than “bona fide qualifications based on 
sex” the statute lists specific examples of conduct that is characterized as permissible qualifications 
based on sex. 
 213. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 165 (Wash. 
2003) (“the average informed voter would have believed that I-200 only prohibited reverse 
discrimination where a less qualified person or applicant is given an advantage over a more qualified 
applicant. An average informed voter would understand that racially neutral programs designed to 
foster and promote diversity to provide educationally enriched environments would be permitted by 
the initiative.”). 
 214. See James C. Rehnquist, Note: The Power that Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare 
Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 BOSTON U. L.REV. 345 (1986)(comparing court 
decisions on the Constitution to those on statutes and stating, “[w]hen the Supreme Court construes 
statutes, on the other hand, it does not act as the sole and ultimate arbiter of deliberately ambiguous 
language. It is not final. Congress can respond to the Court’s construction of statutes; a model of 
judicial-legislative partnership is at work”). 
 215. Anderson, supra note 210, at 260. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 261-62. 
 219. Op. to Att’y. Gen. re. Amendment to Bar Gov’t from Treating People Differently Based 
on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 896 (Fla. 2000)(“[T]he proposed amendments’ substantial 
effect on local government entities, coupled with its curtailment of the powers of the legislative and 
judicial branches, renders it fatally defective and violative of the single-subject requirement. It is 
precisely this sort of ‘cataclysmic change’ that the drafters of the single-subject rule labored to 
prevent”). 
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did issue an executive order eliminating the state set-aside programs and 
guaranteeing admission to one of the state’s universities for the “top 20 
percent of high school graduates, provided they had completed the 
college prep curriculum.” This plan was called the “One Florida” plan, 
and was approved by the regents in the spring of 2000, eliminating the 
consideration of race and sex in Florida’s college admissions criteria.220
 Currently, citizens in Michigan are appealing a decision by the 
Michigan Board of Canvassers not to certify the signatures collected in 
support of a vote on the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, patterned after 
California’s Proposition 209.221 The Initiative has been placed on 
Michigan’s November 2006, ballot.222
 The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to dilute state and federal 
policies that discriminate or give preferences based on race or sex, 
believing the policies to be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Civil Rights Acts.223 States are free to adopt laws that address 
race and sex issues in employment, education and contracting, similar to 
the constitutional amendment implemented by Proposition 209. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 It is undeniable that minorities and women continue to face 
challenges and barriers to employment, education, and contracting. 
Proposition 209 eliminates race- and sex-based affirmative action 
programs that were implemented to help minorities and women 
overcome those challenges and barriers. While discrimination and 
preferential treatment based on a variety of characteristics may be 
inevitable in a free-market system, supporters of Proposition 209 believe 
that allowing discrimination and preferential treatment based on race and 
sex is undesirable, unfair, and inefficient. Comparing the pre- and post-
Proposition 209 statistics by race and gender demonstrates that women 
and minorities have not lost any ground in employment, education, or 
public contracting because of Proposition 209’s prohibition of 
discrimination and preferential treatment. Although minorities and 
women have not lost any ground due to Proposition 209, they have not 
made substantial progress either. Programs that do not violate 
Proposition 209, such as those based on socioeconomic status or 
geography, are better suited to the needs of all citizens that face 
 220. Anderson, supra note 210, at 262. 
 221. See generally Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, available at, http://www.michigan 
civilrights.org (last accessed Aug.12, 2005). 
 222. Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, Mission Statement, available at, http://www.michigan 
civilrights.org/mission.htm (last accessed Oct. 19, 2005). 
 223. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 
(1987); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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challenges and barriers to their upward mobility. In the future, California 
and other states that adopt measures similar to Proposition 209 should 
continue to help minorities, women, and others with race- and sex-
neutral solutions. 
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